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Abstract. QCA’s grasp on causation is often questioned from a probabilistic, experimental 
understanding of validity. QCA results however rely on logical and set-theoretical inferences. Is a 
difference in languages enough to justify a separate validity yardsticks? And what secures that 
QCA is delivering valid results? 
The review of quantitative and qualitative exemplary yardsticks shows that traditions share 
validity concerns, yet give them different contents. The article argues that such difference is 
legitimized by the special assumptions about causation that inform their research processes. It 
therefore clarifies QCA causal ontology, identifies its special threats, and evaluates the strategies 
in use to prevent or tackle them - also adding a new one to address over-specified hypotheses. In 
this, the nomothetic yardstick proves to be a fertile framework, yet hardly a proper guideline for 
solutions. 
 
Keywords. Causation, Explanation, Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Research paradigms, 
Validity. 
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Validity is the property claimed by any research conclusion that aspires to 
be credible. The claim is usually grounded in evidence that the research 
process has avoided, or limited, the effects of possible biases, errors, and 
ambiguity on findings (Cook & Campbell 1979). Especially in the domain of 
«why question» research, such evidence is therefore crucial. Belief has it that, 
whatever the technique used to shape inferences, without evidence of validity 
no result can be accepted as «proven», «sound», or «true». Those from 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (therefore, QCA) make no exception, as 
recent works have remarked (Tanner 2014). Also, whatever the technique, 
belief has it that evidence of validity can be achieved - if the research process 
sticks to special benchmarks. 
How general these benchmarks are, however, it has long been the subject 
of a lively debate across disciplines and research traditions. The point is 
highly consequential, as unfitting benchmarks can impose inconsistent 
procedures which disrupt inferences instead of strengthening them. 
Nevertheless, it is still far from clear whether any yardstick can claim the title 
of «gold standard» - even within a same tradition.  
The article addresses such puzzle by first looking for guidance in the 
yardsticks which have shaped the debate in the domain of policy studies, 
where the stakes of the validity game are higher, and the benchmarks clearer. 
In section 1, the review of exemplary yardsticks (Shadish et al. 2002; 
LeCompte & Goetz 1982; Lincoln & Guba 1986; Yin 2000a) shows that the 
concept of validity entails common concerns, yet has been given fairly 
different contents. It is argued that such differences are legitimate as far as 
they follow differences in key assumptions - about how to conceive of 
causality, and about how to best seize it. Validity standards simply secure 
that the technical construction and treatment of data are kept consistent 
with the special coupling of ontology and epistemology embedded into a 
research strategy. Thus, a same standard applies when at least one of the two 
sides of causal knowledge is shared - and separate standards are required 
when ontology and epistemology differ.  
The further operation required to evaluate the applicability of any validity 
yardstick to QCA, therefore, consists in the identification of the special 
ontology and epistemology embedded in its inferences. Section 2 identifies 
the former in the mechanistic understanding of causality as drawn by Bhaskar 
(1975) and Pawson (1989), and the latter in the set-theoretical technique 
developed by Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008) after Barton (1955). Threats, and 
strategies «for ruling them off», are therefore discussed in the light of these 
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fundamental assumptions - and some new consistent protocols advanced for 
improving the causal validity of QCA results, before the final remarks in 
Section 3. 
 
2. Validity standards 
As for policy studies and evaluation, the debate about the contents and 
the applicability of validity standards has unfolded since the late 1960s from 
the nomothetic camp. Here Campbell and his associates have provided a 
systematization which, in its evolution, is still considered the main yardstick 
and, for long, the single best. Such Olympic might has however been 
reconsidered after critical reactions from within and outside the approach. 
Within, the ambition to fully valid causal results has been downscaled, 
together with the capacity ascribed to the research strategy to grasp actual 
causation. Outside, the notion of a hierarchy of methods - implied by the 
nomothetic understanding - has been vigorously challenged by qualitative 
scholars - with the side-effect of spreading the interest in validity. Trying to 
justify the inapplicability of the nomothetic yardstick to their studies, 
scholars in the idiographic camp have thus developed their own criteria. 
Their arguments, and the contents given to the concept, will then be used for 
clarifying what - if anything - in validity can be considered a cross-cutting 
standard, and why. 
 
.1. The nomothetic yardstick 
The nomothetic understanding assumes that covariation always indicates 
some causal connection, and its validity revolves around a threefold proof: 
that the covariation occurs; that it occurs between the hypothesized 
«treatment» and «outcome» alone; and that such treatment is consequential 
compared to a «counterfactual» baseline.  
The overall operation is therefore quite delicate, and exposed to many 
threats. In addressing them, Campbell (1957) developed a typology with two 
relevant dimensions - «internal» and «external» - later specified by two 
further additions - «statistical» and «construct» (Shadish & al., 2002; Cook & 
Campbell, 1979, 1983; Campbell & Stanley, 1966). In it, 
1) «internal validity» addresses causal-reasoning errors, and revolves around 
the question «did the experimental stimulus make some significant 
difference in this specific instance?» (Campbell 1957:297). It hence focuses 
on the extent to which evidence neatly supports the causal inference, and 
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weakens whenever the changes in the outcome cannot be undoubtedly 
ascribed to changes in the treatment alone - here, because of, for instance, 
errors in the identification of the cause; differential unaccounted changes 
within the cases under analysis; ambiguities; deterioration of gauges and 
phenomena; or causal models hidden the error term, in fixed effects, or in 
the control variables.  
2) «statistical conclusion validity» addresses the same question than above, 
but from the perspective of statistical covariation. It requires that the 
model is properly specified - that all the causal variables are included; that 
the relationship is not correlational and is imposed neither the wrong 
functional form nor the incorrect parameter constraints; that the direction 
of causality is unambiguous. It therefore weakens if false positives or false 
negatives are unreasonably likely because of low statistical significance or 
low statistical power; by relevant omitted variables; by violations of the 
specific assumptions of key tests in the analysis; or by misinterpreted 
differences among statistical models. 
3) «external validity» is defined by the question, «to what populations, 
settings, and variables can this effect be generalized?» (Campbell 
1957:297). It refers to the robustness of the treatment’s causal power - the 
extent to which its relationship with the effect holds beyond the 
circumstances of the study, so proving its nomological nature. It weakens 
whenever the predictor interacts with case selection, setting, history, or 
other treatments - each of which narrows the domain of validity of the 
causal relationship. 
4) «Construct validity» relates to external validity, as it focuses on the link 
between «constructs» - namely, general traits, prototypical features, or 
properties used to hypothesize the causal relationship - and «sampling 
particulars» - that is, the empirical instances and the measures that 
operationalize such hypothesis. Their relation weakens if slippages occur, 
so that empirical instances do not match the prototypical features 
properly - which leaves the researcher with the problem of establishing 
whether her results depend on how the hypothesis was defined, or on 
how it was operationalized. In this framework, the problem becomes 
either deductive - of precision in the selection of empirical instances, as 
well as of reliability of their gauges - or inductive - of misspecification of 
the constructs that substantiate empirical conclusions.  
According to this literature, all the threats can be reasonably kept at bay. 
The ones to internal and to statistical validity can be «ruled off» by design. 
The threats increase in severity as much as the conditions of a study deviate 
from the optimality of scientific experiments: so, the first best strategy to 
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secure validity is to adopt an experimental design - especially with 
Randomized Control Trials, which therefore becomes the «gold standard» -, 
or, as a weaker alternative, on covariational analyses structured so to 
approximate the experimental rationale. Whatever the design, internal and 
statistical validity also require careful sampling and measurement to 
minimize errors, and a wise utilization and interpretation of tests. External 
validity follows when the results from internally/statistically valid studies are 
confirmed under different conditions of time, setting, units of analysis and 
gauges. Construct validity is made safe when different constructs across 
replications and reproductions prove clear-cut and non-overlapping - so that 
alternative, precise gauges of a same construct correlate, whilst measures of 
different constructs do not. 
a) Accepting limitations… 
At the same time, scholars in this tradition agree that a single real study 
cannot achieve validity along all the dimensions at once. Instead, each 
analysis necessarily prioritizes, and trades validities - especially 
internal/statistical for external and construct. To some, trade-offs simply 
follow constraints to available resources, so that complete validity can be 
achieved as much as results from reproductions and replications cumulate 
and are systematized - for instance by meta-analyses (Shadish & al., 2002). 
Cumulation however requires that replication and reproduction studies meet 
the criteria of «maximum similarity […] to the conditions of application which 
is compatible with internal validity» (Campbell & Stanley, 1966): yet, often 
optimal comparability is simply not available. Other scholars thus conclude 
that perfect validity lies well beyond the analytic capacities of any 
nomothetic design - thus leaving internal/statistical criteria as the main 
requisites that a study can aspire to meet. As a consequence, even in the 
fortunate case of a positive result, experimental evidence can only tell that the 
treatment led to the outcome «in at least some members of some fixed 
causally homogeneous subpopulations» (Cartwright, 2007:17).  
Such conclusion however does not fall short on nomothetic ambitions as 
much as the heuristic goals of these techniques are made out clear. Variable-
oriented studies are mainly concerned with ascertaining the «effect of a 
cause» - i.e., that «a particular variable or small set of variables makes a 
marginal difference in some outcome over and above all the other forces» 
(Shadish & al., 2002:457). Their goal is thus fulfilled when a sound «causal 
description» is provided - the empirical relation between a predictor and an 
outcome is «purified» and contrasted with expectations and evidence from a 
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counterfactual baseline. The analysis therefore narrows on the potential 
causal power of some property to make an outcome occur, even regardless of 
its empirical relevance; and only clarifies «whether something can happen, 
rather than whether it typically does» or will (Mook 1983: 382). What cannot 
and should not be expected from such strategy, therefore, is that analyses 
«completely explain some phenomenon» (Shadish & al., ibid.). 
Indeed, variable-oriented, probabilistic studies are seldom meant for 
accounting for why and how an actual causal relationship did (not) obtain 
across real cases. To some, this is because variable-oriented analyses gauge 
causation as a constant, probabilistic «arrow» from the treatment to the 
outcome, and not as variable, deterministic «pretzels» (Cook, 2000).  
b) …and pushing them 
A nomothetic technique for complex causation has nevertheless been 
advanced by Spirtes et al. (2000). Developing the agenda set by Pearl (1988), 
they aim to provide an empirical basis for «intelligent planning» - meant as a 
judgment about the logical truth or falsity of future conditional sentences («if 
X were to be the case, then Y would be the case») on the bases of past counterfactual 
evidence («If X had been the case, then Y would have been the case»). Here, an accurate 
knowledge of the causal structure becomes crucial for identifying what 
should be manipulated in order to push the outcome in the desired direction: 
and such structure, they acknowledge, has the shape of conditional causality. 
The structural approach hence allows for more than one cause to insists 
on the outcome - so that either none of them alone is enough for the outcome 
to occur, or that all are independently sufficient to bring an overdetermined 
outcome about. Furthermore, here causes can be direct - when they are 
proximate effectors to the outcome - but also indirect - when their impact on 
the outcome only unfolds through one «mediator» or more. An indirect cause 
may also be common to two separate mediators - and, unlike in standard 
regression-based models, this does not affect their causal relevance as 
effectors: only, it clarifies the paths of causation to the outcome. The overall 
structure is then given by causal chains in which indirect causes effect the 
immediate descendant(s) only, and the last mediators alone effect the 
outcome.  
Complex causation hence can be modeled starting from direct causation. 
Spirtes defines it first in categorical-like terms. Causes and effects are 
conceived of as «Boolean variables» - dummy classifications of events «as of a 
kind», so that each event A is paired with its non-occurrence ~A. In such 
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terms, Boolean variable C causes Boolean variable A if and only if at least the 
presence or the absence of C effects at least the presence or the absence of A. 
As a consequence, in Sprites’ terms, being V a fixed set of events which 
includes C and A, C is a direct cause of A if C is a member of the set C included 
in V~A such that (i) C is cause to A; (ii) the events in C, were they to occur, 
would cause A no matter whether the events in V~(AC) were or were not to 
occur; (iii) there is no proper subset of C that satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) 
(Spirtes et al. 2000:21). Interestingly enough, such definition does not delimit 
causation; rather, it delineates directness, and in a way that makes sense 
when translated into the language of causal dependence between variables. 
Here, it reads as: variable C is a direct cause of variable A relative to V 
provided that (i) C is a member of a set C of variables in V; (ii) there exists a 
set of values c for variables in C and a value a for variable A such that, were 
the variables in C to take on values c, they would cause A to take on value a no 
matter what the values of other variables in V; and (iii) no proper subset of C 
satisfies (i) and (ii) (ibid.). It so becomes clear that V is the overall model, C a 
direct cause in the multi-causal system C, A is the outcome variable, the 
events in V~(AC) are the error term; and that causality means a statistical 
covariation of the outcome A and the overall causal structure C - as defined by 
effectors which however depend on their «parents» and «grandparents». 
When V is «causally sufficient» to a population - i.e. when every common 
cause either is perfectly included in the causal structure, or at least takes the 
same value for all the units in the population - the model can be treated as a 
deterministic system, in which the values of the «exogenous» uncaused 
variables determine unique values for all the others.  
Such causal sufficiency is achieved when the relationship between the 
graph of the structure and the related probability distributions meets three 
intertwined conditions - namely, (1) the Causal Markov Condition: the 
probability distribution of each vertex in the structure proves independent of 
the probability distribution of any cause other than its «descendants» and 
«parents», given parents; (2) the Causal Minimality Condition: each edge in 
the graph does prevent some conditional independence relation that would 
otherwise obtain; (3) the Faithfulness Condition: the causal structure 
displays no further independence relation than the Markov ones, and the 
overall probability distribution and its graph are «faithful» one another. The 
first condition is therefore crucial to the remaining two, and special validity 
weaknesses arise that take the form of challenges to Markov independence - 
especially after non-homogeneity. So, for instance, when causes in different 
subpopulations are pooled together in a single variable, the resulting mix of 
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different probability distributions may prove all possible conditional 
dependence relations true - with the paradoxical effect that the pooled 
variable does neither satisfy nor violate the Markov condition. Mixed 
populations may also lead to probability distributions that statistically satisfy 
the Markov condition without entailing any substantial causation, but simply 
because they result from systems with same graph and parameters 
independently distributed. Also, the Markov condition may not be satisfied 
for variables so far from each other that no sensible common cause can be 
envisaged, simply because their distributions have similar trends over time: 
yet, once again, out of quantum mechanics this would only make sense in 
some debatable mixture of populations. Furthermore, the same direct cause 
effecting the opposite outcome in two subpopulations may appear 
independent to the outcome when the two populations are pooled - thus 
violating the Faithfulness condition. Hence, a key relevance is given to the 
consistency of the relationship between variables and homogeneous 
population, as it can prevent misleading results.  
In Spirtes’ view, the main threats to the validity of nomothetic complex 
causation thus stem from the statistical dimension. Again, they can be ruled 
off by approximating the variables to the conditions of causal sufficiency: 
once the population homogeneity, the absence of unmeasured common 
causes, and a clear linear order of variables - especially by time - are given, the 
values of the probabilistic dependencies in the population are ideally enough 
to determine the unique graph satisfying the Markov and Minimality 
conditions stepwise, even without prior theoretical knowledge. Knowledge 
however still plays a key role in at least the selection of exogenous variables 
and of last effectors, as well as in the «proper» gauge of all variables - as no 
reliable inference is possible without. 
Apart from a weaker external validity - already considered as a minor 
dimension in standard experimental studies -, the nomothetic causal 
structures therefore do not challenge the rationale of the overall strategy: they 
just widen its causal ontology. Indeed, they still postulates a sequential 
understanding of causation as a closed linear probabilistic process unfolding, 
like billiard balls, from remote independent to proximate factors to the 
outcome. The resulting structure of local «effects of causes-of-causes» is far 
more informative than the standard model in «effect of a cause» studies; also, 
it has noble fathers, and finds wide applications (Salmon 1998, Pearl 2000). 
Nevertheless, it mainly models causality as path-dependency alone: so, 
despite that the occurrence of the outcome follows the effectors at the end of 
the causal chain, the attention is shifted to exogenous remote causes as prior 
determinants - so that desired changes in the outcome are expected after 
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changes in such remote factors. Interestingly enough, however, these remote 
causes alone do not seem enough to allow for any reliable prediction about 
the unfolding of causation. Also, effectors may go statistically undetected, or 
be statistically indistinguishable - for instance when their effects are 
«coincidental vanishing partial correlations», which make the whole structure 
unstable unless cross-kinship ties are removed from the structure. 
The nomothetic pretzels are thus modular assemblages of direct 
covariations, and hold in the restricted domain of precise statistical 
parameters. Whenever a hypothesis about actual causality violates them in a 
module, the usual strategy is to drop the hypothesis from the model for the 
sake of validity. As a consequence, the critiques claim, the rigorous 
application of nomothetic yardsticks secures representations of causal reality 
that are self-consistent and clear, yet not necessarily commensurate to actual 
causation - at the cost of the «usability» of such knowledge. 
 
.2. The idiographic criteria 
That case-oriented strategies can be better at seizing actual complex 
causation is a long-standing claim of qualitative scholars.  
Indeed, field research finds its reason in the intensive analysis of the 
contexts where special actual events and processes bring about specific 
phenomena of interest. Moreover, case-oriented inquiry seems to resonate 
better with the mechanistic understanding of causation that has increasingly 
been attracting attention for its explanation of uneven local causation - up to 
causation in a single case (Maxwell 2004; Glennan 2002). It assumes that a 
variable’s causal power is a disposition and remains latent unless some 
mechanism is triggered or defused. The disposition actualizes if the variable 
interacts with other special conditions which, however, are contextual and 
irregularly distributed. So, from case to case, a same mechanism may not 
obtain because of the presence of a hindering factor or the absence of the 
trigger; or may obtain because of different yet equally effective triggers; or 
may not obtain, but the phenomenon of interest can still occur because of 
some alternative mechanism. The approach hence truly focuses on the «causes 
of an effect», and aims at providing explanations - i.e., at identifying those 
conditions which, together, account for the (non) activation of a mechanism 
beneath some local, past (non) occurrence.  
As far as mechanisms depend on, or are, concomitances of local events, 
intensive field research thus can with some reason claim to be better 
equipped for grasping them. For long, however, the results of qualitative 
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studies have been only recognized the status of hypotheses, not of proper 
assessments. Campbell and Stanley (1966) equated case studies to one-group, 
post-test-only «queasy-experiments» from which ambiguous evidence alone 
could result, and little be learned with certainty. In a nutshell, such findings 
could not be taken as valid. A mounting dissatisfaction with the Campbellian 
yardstick followed. Qualitative scholars complained that experimental 
requirements had grown into the universal standard for establishing how 
worth a research was, yet proved impossible to meet - especially outside 
probabilistic studies. They however agreed that prizing subjectivity and 
direct observation did not mean that qualitative inferences were free from 
threats. They therefore stressed the need for fairer validation criteria. The 
resulting proposals however display remarkable differences in contents, as 
well as in the distance to the nomothetic yardstick.  
a) Radical diversity 
From the perspective of ethnographic research, LeCompte and Goetz 
(1982) refuse the term «validity» for the positivistic meanings it entails. They 
therefore speak of «credibility», which they see as an issue shared by the two 
traditions alike. Both are concerned with the «accuracy» of the match 
between constructs and empirical reality, and by the «replicability» of 
research results. In their opinion, these shared concerns however do not 
justify a unique standard, because of the different use of induction. In their 
words, «experimental researchers hope to find data to match a theory; 
ethnographers hope to find a theory that explains their data» (ibid:34). To 
them, ethnographic research typically understands phenomena as the 
«interplay among variables situated in … an intact cultural scene» (ibid.: 33, 
54). It deals with such interplay by first providing a thick atheoretical 
description of the whole complexity, then by unraveling and making sense of 
it through concepts and hypotheses - starting from those with currency in the 
context. Such explanations gain the status of causal statements when their 
«typicality» makes them useful for understanding other contexts, too. 
Ethnographic generalizability is therefore not of studies, which are unique, 
but of the resulting constructs alone; for securing it, findings have to 
«delineate the characteristics of the group studied or of the construct 
generated so clearly that they can serve as a basis for comparison with other 
like and unlike groups» (ibid:34). Yet, reduction to typicality in ethnographic 
research is retrospective and lies at the end of the research process; if 
operated prematurely, it becomes an unmendable source of idiosyncratic bias. 
So, in contrast to conventional research, here imprecise and redundant 
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observations become constitutive parts of the good practice, as they later 
allow the researcher to deal with history fruitfully and to establish for 
instance «which baseline data remain stable over time and which data 
change» (ibid:45). The dynamic nature of the context also justifies creative 
adaptations of the observational protocol in the making. The little 
proceduralization of the research process and design, again, is therefore 
necessitated by the special epistemology of the tradition, and does not 
undermine the credibility of results - at least until adjustments are justified 
and open to scrutiny. Threats rather arise when the researcher becomes so 
familiar with the context that she gets blind to relevant evidence, or from the 
distorting effects that her techniques for eliciting responses have on 
observations - threats which cannot be prevented by collection design, but by 
«disciplining» subjectivity. Transparency hence becomes the key criterion - 
that does not secure sound conclusions but indirectly, as it restraints the 
investigator’s behavior by making her constantly aware that her research 
strategy will later be judged by many different observers. 
A similar yet more radical and systematic redefinition of validity comes 
from Lincoln & Guba (1982, 1986), and from their understanding of the 
qualitative methods as expressions of a single «naturalistic» counter-
paradigm of inquiry. Their key tenet maintains that «all human behavior is 
time- and context-bound» - which to them entails the hopelessness of law-
like knowledge. A better research instead develops from «working 
hypotheses» about the local unfolding of actions - explainable in terms «of 
multiple interacting factors, events, and processes that give shape to it and 
are part of it» (Lincoln & Guba, 1986:17). Indeed their naturalistic inquirer 
can «establish plausible inferences» about «patterns and webs» of such 
complex local unfolding: but from data shaped in an open relationship of 
bargaining, mutual learning, and joint control with the respondents. In their 
view, the impossibility of research neutrality also compels the inquirer to 
make the research process into a strategy for improving the social 
interactions she is observing: so, under the label of «authenticity», they 
defined new special requirements that naturalistic research has to meet - such 
as the fair representation of all the values; or the positive effect of the research 
process and of its results on the actors - in terms of higher awareness of their 
context and dynamics, improved capabilities, deeper engagement. As for the 
knowledge so created, Lincoln & Guba redefine Campbellian validity as 
positivistic «rigor», then pit naturalistic «trustworthiness» against it. In their 
«trustworthiness», 
1) Internal validity becomes «credibility», indicating the agreement of the 
inquired that the inquirer’s insight is plausible. Credibility is therefore 
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undermined by sources of «distortion» such as saliences in some situation; 
biases of the investigators, of the respondents, or of the technique for data 
collection; and contradictory information; 
2) External validity becomes «transferability», that is, the plausibility of 
applying judgments from a context to another. It weakens when it cannot 
be established whether the receiving context is dissimilar from the 
sending one; 
3) Reliability turns into «dependability», which indicates that the process 
and goals of inquiry have appropriately adapted to the evolution of the 
social processes of which the investigator is part and observer. It weakens 
when the inquirer is not transparent about such adjustments; 
4) Objectivity makes place to «confirmability», meaning that interpretation 
is transparently grounded in observations. It weakens when 
reconstructions are not substantiated with proper evidence. 
Here again, threats can be controlled. Credibility is increased by 
prolonged engagement and observation, triangulation, peer debriefing, 
negative case analysis, and checks and feedbacks from the inquired. 
Transferability requires that the inquirer’s insight goes with a thick 
description of the context, so that the similarity of the «receiving» one can be 
evaluated - «although it is by no means clear how “thick” a thick description 
needs to be» (Lincoln & Guba, 1986:19). Both dependability and 
confirmability call for transparency of inferences and of the underlying 
processes, and can be secured by a competent external, disinterested audit of 
process and products, respectively.  
b) Normalized diversity 
In contrast with relativistic approaches to validity, Yin (2013; 2000) has 
institutionalized a successful account of the case-study method in which 
«rigor» can fruitfully apply to qualitative findings, too. In his view, case 
studies do produce sound scientific knowledge: whereas they cannot justify 
inferences about populations, they are nevertheless capable of «analytic 
generalizations» to theory. Especially when driven by a «why» question, they 
can corroborate a concept against some rival hypotheses, or provide empirical 
reasons for developing new ones. Otherwise said, they too can prove causality 
by rejecting alternative explanations: only, while probabilistic strategies 
conflate such alternatives in error terms of which they prove the irrelevance, 
case-studies adjudicate on few explicit rivals which are assumed relevant to 
the events under analysis (Yin 2000). This explanatory capacity however 
unfolds when, as in conventional quantitative studies and unlike much 
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qualitative inquiry, the research design is detailed, and consistency is 
maintained between empirical evidence and the starting question. Yin finds 
the case-study rationale so close to the nomothetic standard that he takes the 
Campbellian typology onboard with almost the same labels - and some 
adjustment mainly for disconnecting validity from probabilistic data and 
treatments. So, in his proposal, 
1) Construct validity becomes the first criteria, requiring the identification 
of the «correct» measures to operationalize theoretical concepts and 
hypothesize relations before fieldwork. The operation is meant for 
preventing the researcher from stacking the deck in favor of some pet idea 
while collecting data; 
2) Internal, or logical, validity requires that inferences are unambiguous - i.e., 
that «compelling» relationships are established between antecedents and 
consequences. Data collection has hence to be drawn so to anticipate 
possible ambiguities during the analysis, and to make conclusions 
«airtight» to counterarguments; 
3) External validity relates to the generalizability of results, and entails the 
definition of the theoretical domain in which the findings hold; 
4) Reliability refers to the need of minimizing errors and biases along the 
research process, and requires evidence that the key research operations 
would lead to the same results if reproduced by a different researcher. 
Differences nevertheless resurface in the strategies for case-oriented 
research to meet the four criteria. External validity means theoretical 
generalization alone, and increases when the study revolves around wide-
ranging «if-then» hypotheses. Reliability passes through the transparency of 
the research process, and is secured by explicit protocols and the creation of 
case study databases. Construct validity improves through triangulation, 
member checks and feedbacks, and consistent theoretical-empirical 
connections. Internal validity is strengthened by establishing explicit 
expectations about key empirical patterns before the analysis, by building 
consistent empirical explanations, and by providing logical proofs of the 
explanatory (ir)relevance of rival hypotheses. On this latter point, Yin agrees 
with nomothetic scholars on the importance of research design, and of 
counterfactual reasoning in assessing «rivals». Ambiguous conclusions can 
hence be prevented if multiple cases are selected purposefully - because they 
are critical, extreme, unusual, common, or revelatory of theories, so that they 
can provide clear evidence about special conditional statements inspired by 
counterfactual thinking. In this way, the local relevance can be tested of key 
alternative explanations - such as chance, history, maturation, instability, 
mortality, implementation, or a wider «suspect» than hypothesized. 
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.3. A rose by any other name? 
Beneath their differences, all positions can agree with Maxwell (1992:283) 
that, by and large, validity focuses on the «relationship between an account 
and something outside - whether this something is construed as objective 
reality, the constructions of actors, or a variety of other possible 
interpretations». As such, validity is a cross-cutting concern about the 
consistency of the relationship between the starting question, the selection of 
information, its transformation into treatable aggregates, analysis, and 
conclusions about causation. Otherwise said, both camps have developed 
strategies to secure that their gauges and processes of induction lead to 
results as free from biases and ambiguities as possible. Also, regardless of 
labels and classifications, valid causal inference always entails some use of 
counterfactual thinking - usually operationalized in the research design as 
«negative cases» or baseline «control groups». Yet, the few but influential 
examples above provide evidence that these common points become striking 
differences when such strategies are detailed.  
In the nomothetic camp, requirements for a sound inference mean that (1) 
data are defined to operationalize a clear covariational hypothesis; come from 
gauges of the prototypical cause and effect as precise as possible; are collected 
from a wide and homogeneous sample; and are aggregated into variables 
whose behavior fits the assumptions for a sound statistical treatment. Also, 
(2) the analysis runs convincing tests of the insulation of the prototypical 
relationship from any other source of influence, ambiguity and bias - so that 
the treatment is left as the only cause, and its effect can be evaluated against 
some baseline. Moreover, (3) information is provided that makes the study 
replicable and reproducible, so that the prototypical relationship can be 
cumulatively proven a nomological nature or, more reasonably, be given a 
clear empirical domain.  
Quite differently, a sound idiographic inference instead follows when (1) 
observations are selected after some theory, although at the beginning they may 
be only loosely related to constructs; are rich enough, and as balanced (or 
fair) as possible, to provide arguments for the application of a leading theory 
and of some explicit rivals; are constructed transparently (though not always 
dispassionately) from one or more theoretically relevant cases; may or may 
not be coded, but are always aggregated into statements of facts which are 
non-contradictory and commensurable with rivals - or part of them. Also, (2) 
the analysis displays extensive evidence that statements of facts are 
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grounded, and logically connects them to theoretical concepts. Moreover, (3) 
information is provided for other researchers to evaluate the similarity of the 
case to other contexts of interest - which define the applicability of a theory. 
Why similar concerns turn into such different benchmark cannot simply 
be explained by the type of data used or by the method of treatment. Such 
preferences do not clearly discriminate among research strategies - at least 
because of the empirical eclecticism of idiographic studies. Differences rather 
run at a deeper level - of the core tenets about the nature of causation, of 
inference, hence of good results. From this perspective, in the nomothetic 
camp we find that  
a) causation indicates that an «if-then» law-like relationship exists; takes the 
form of a probabilistic sequence of classes of events; and is properly seized 
in statistical terms as a covariation; 
b) to infer causation means to prove that a change in the probability of the 
prototypical effect follows a change in the probability of the prototypical 
cause - either simple or compound - neat of other influences; 
c) good results allow for prediction of the future values of the effect, at the 
aggregate level, given the cause and a stable domain of validity. 
Quite the opposite, the idiographic camp maintains that 
a) causation indicates the complex local co-generation of some phenomenon 
of interest; takes the form of situated interactions among multiple social 
and individual factors; and is properly seized in theoretical terms, as the 
discovery/unveiling/construction of connected constructs; 
b) to infer causation means to disentangle the factors beneath the 
occurrences in the context of analysis, then to see how they logically fit a 
theory (or its rivals); 
c) good results make broad sense of past local interactions as patterns or 
relationships with theoretical and evaluative relevance. 
Thus, it is the difference in ontological and epistemological assumptions 
about causality which makes the two strategies into alternative research 
paradigms, and legitimizes the difference in the prescriptions for securing 
consistency to the research processes - hence, in the validity yardsticks. 
What does it mean to QCA? 
 
3. A validity of its own 
QCA is often understood as a hybrid of qualitative and quantitative 
analysis - a mixed method. Indeed, on the one side, QCA displays many 
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elements of the idiographic strategy, especially from Yin’s explanatory case 
studies: it is theory-driven; it relies on cross-case comparisons; it does not 
speak the language of probability, instead looking for the «dead causes» of an 
effect. On the other side, its source of counterfactual evidence lies in all the 
cases which meet a clear scope condition; its analysis is systematic; and its 
results may evoke those of multi-causal and cluster analyses. At a deeper 
level, however, QCA (Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008; Rihoux and Ragin 2009; 
Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 2012) really stands out as a third research 
paradigm, as its understanding of causation is substantially different from any 
other. Indeed, 
a) QCA agrees with the idiographics that causation indicates the complex 
generation of some phenomenon of interest; with structural nomothetics, 
that such complexity is conditional, set-theoretical, and Boolean. Yet, 
QCA basically focuses on «chemical» reactions activated by the presence 
or the absence of special properties, or conditions, consistently with 
Bhaskar’s philosophy of science. Causality is the potential power of a 
property which only unfolds after the activation of some deep mechanism 
unobservable to the researcher. The researcher can nevertheless explain the 
uneven occurrence of an outcome: first, by guessing the functioning of the 
activating mechanism; then, by deducing which special enabling and 
triggering system conditions would activate the mechanism, were the 
guess true; and eventually by verifying that the outcome actually occurred 
in those systems alone displaying these conditions as expected (Bhaskar 
1975; Pawson 1989; Ragin 1987; Befani & Sager 2006). Therefore, causation 
is seized in set-theoretical terms, as an asymmetrical relationship of 
sufficiency between the joint occurrence - i.e. conjunctions - of generative 
properties and an outcome. Such set-theoretical relationship can take 
many shapes. «Standard QCA» appraises one-shot conjunctions of 
reagents (Ragin 1987). If the order in which the reagents are added to the 
system is supposed to influence the activation of the mechanism, 
conjuctions can be conceived of as temporal ordered sequences by «time-
QCA» (Ragin & Strand 2008). If different reagents are hypothesized to 
trigger after different contextual catalysts, such nested causation can be 
modeled in a «two-step QCA» (Schneider & Wagemann 2006). All these 
shapes of causation are not discovered at the end of the process, but 
hypothesized at the beginning whence they shape up the research 
protocol. 
b) Inference, again like in the idiographic strategy, takes high complexity as its 
starting point and consists in reduction. However, as in the nomothetic 
understanding, this complexity is restricted to few conditions - selected 
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after the theoretical expectation that they would have jointly caused the 
outcome, had they been observed. The starting hypothesis is therefore a 
conjunction which includes all the triggering and enabling conditions that 
can be theoretically supposed to activate the mechanism of interest when 
present in a system. Cases hence become instances of the starting 
hypothesis when they display all the theoretical conditions and associate 
it to the occurrence of the outcome: yet, there may be cases lacking one or 
more of the theoretical conditions and still leading to the outcome, and 
cases with some generative conditions where the outcome did not occur. 
Inference depends on the evidence of the generative power of such 
alternative «primitive configurations», which counterfactually 
demonstrates the irrelevance of single properties to the occurrence of the 
outcome given other reactants: when a property is the only varying part in 
two otherwise alike configurations with same outcome, its contribution 
proves irrelevant to the explanation, and it can therefore be dropped. Each 
reactant can therefore be found irrelevant to some explanation yet not to 
others, depending on how configurations are matched. Hence, there are as 
many explanations as «minimization paths». These solutions, or «prime 
implicants», detail which mix of reacting properties account for the 
occurrence of the outcome in special clusters of cases, or single cases. The 
starting hypothesis can however be falsified when even one prime 
implicant is contradictory - covering cases with positive and negative 
outcomes. 
c) Good results therefore are unambiguous explanations - that is, minimal 
sufficient configurations accounting for the occurrence, and separately the 
non-occurrence - of the outcome across cases in a population at a given 
time point. As such, results have evaluative and theoretical relevance - as 
they can clarify which configurations succeeded and which failed. 
In the light of these special tenets, it makes sense that, in QCA, a sound 
inference follows when (1) row data are identified after a theoretical 
hypothesis about the capacity of conditions for activating a mechanism; are 
collected from a population of cases, selected neither with the aim of 
homogeneity nor for their exemplarity, but because of a scope condition 
consistent with the theoretical hypothesis and the operationalization of the 
explanatory conditions; may be either qualitative or quantitative, yet have to 
provide information about at least the two basic statuses of presence and 
absence of any causal property in each case - so that the case can be matched 
with a theoretically possible configuration; are «calibrated» into crisp, fuzzy, 
or multi-value conditions - i.e., dummy, continuous or categorical degrees of 
membership to the underlying property-set - after the transparent and 
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reasoned identification of thresholds corresponding to critical points at 
which the membership status changes. Also, (2) the analysis addresses 
contradictions in observed configurations before minimizations, as well as in 
the counterfactual use of unobserved configurations during minimizations. 
Moreover, (3) information is provided that make the operations open to 
scrutiny - but results are «time- and context-bound» explanations of the 
uneven activation of a mechanism across specific cases. Thus, the starting 
theoretical conjunction can be redundant enough for explaining different 
populations at different time-points: but the results of an analysis only apply 
to the population under analysis. 
 
Ontological and epistemological assumptions therefore can provide 
researchers with a criterion for sorting proper from improper threats to 
inference - and relevant solutions from misleading ones. In so doing, however, 
previous classifications may prove confusing. Instead, we can boil the many 
reasons for flawed results down to a cross-cutting threefold problem: the 
researcher was fooled - by gauges, by technicalities, or by design. 
 
.1. Fooled by gauges 
One of the earliest concerns about QCA validity focuses on how accurate 
and clear the correspondence can be of raw variables and property-sets via 
conditions. As the first version of the technique came in crisp values, at issue 
there was the excess of information lost: binary coding entails the explicit 
choice of maximizing the differences between members and non-members of 
a special property-set, at the expenses of the differences within each group, 
which made inference especially exposed to errors. The improvement came 
with fsQCA, where the transformation is more fine-grained. With the aim of 
turning natural language into degrees of membership to the property-set, 
Ragin (2000) built a conversion table of a scale of «natural evaluations» (from 
«fully in» to «fully out» the property-set, through the maximum ambiguity of a 
«crossover» threshold) to membership scores (from 0 to 1, with the crossover 
conventionally at 0,5) mainly useful for calibration via expert evaluation. For 
continuous raw measures, an algorithm was provided that pegs the raw 
values to a sigmoid function by feature-scaling transformations with three 
anchors - the inclusion threshold, above which differences in the raw value 
are irrelevant as the cases are already fully in; the exclusion threshold, below 
which again the null membership is insensitive to differences in raw values; 
and the crossover, shared with csQCA, which sorts «almost in» from «almost 
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out» cases. The decision of where the thresholds should be set is left to the 
researcher, required to be transparent in her choice; however, suggestions 
have been made about external and theoretically informed criteria as the first 
best, followed by decisions based on the meaning of the distribution similar 
to clustering after «natural gaps» - the worst being the unjustified use of 
basics statistics borrowed from the routines of the nomothetic camp.  
Despite the numeric nature of the operation, the original intention of 
calibration does seem closer to the naturalistic understanding of the research 
process as a continuous recursive adjustment of theory and evidence unless a 
coherent picture is provided. So, in textbooks, threshold shifts are also 
suggested as a way to solve possible contradictory lines in the truth table 
without refining the starting hypothesis - and alternative to either dropping 
the case as not informative enough, or treating its value on the ambiguous 
condition as a «don’t care». The choice however requires sound justifications, 
given its consequentiality. As errors can be detected in the relationship of the 
conditions and the outcome, every change in gauges affects it - and it is not 
always clear whether, by recalibrating, we are adjusting evidence to theory, 
fixing an error, forcing dirty data into the working assumptions of the 
method, or manipulating reality for the sake of technical fit. Indeed, 
recalibration moves at least one case which would otherwise falsify the 
starting hypothesis as such from an observed primitive configuration in the 
truth table to another. In itself, this treatment in csQCA may create a false 
positive in an allegedly explanatory model. In fsQCA the problem can be 
better detailed with some yet no definite improvement. Here, the recognition 
of a «measurement error» can follow evidence that actual ambiguous cases are 
too closed to the crossover - of which it is reasonable to suppose the wrong 
classification. Recalibration can therefore stand as a strategy to treat high 
case ambiguity so to maintain the starting hypothesis untouched. Apparently, 
the consequences are less relevant. By crossing the threshold, the ambiguous 
case transfers its ambiguity from an observed configuration to another, which 
so is associated to an outcome -let’s say the negative. The effect on the 
consistency values of other negative configurations can prove almost 
irrelevant, and the new observed ambiguous configuration will not enter 
fuzzy minimizations for the non-outcome, so that its contribution to the 
causal paths is minimal, too. Nevertheless, the move improves the consistency 
of a now positive configuration which so will likely enter minimizations and 
solutions. The risk of having so created a false positive, although in the 
complementary field, is still present. To some scholars, this is enough for 
rejecting QCA - especially in its crisp version - as an unreliable method; 
others consider it as something «inescapable in the practice of data analysis», 
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which however calls for at least sensitivity tests (Varsey 2014). Indeed, 
recalibration has been increasingly used with this aim. Having weak reasons 
for a certain setting of thresholds, alternative calibrations can be applied to a 
same condition, and if this lead to remarkably different causal paths, results 
are considered unreliable. The severity of sensitivity can also be judged on the 
basis of the special changes that recalibration sorts on the different kinds of 
solution: gauges are deemed robust if the change does not affect the results of 
the parsimonious solution (Fiss 2011). Thiem (2010) better details such 
source of unreliability as the joint effect of the crossover with the functional 
shape of the membership score. He proves the logistic shape, embedded in the 
calibration command of the most popular software, to be very sensitive to 
such changes - which makes it suboptimal for stabilizing results when 
compared to, for instance, linear transformations. However, the weakness of 
the original S-shape may turn into a conservative assumption for avoiding 
false positives. In any case, recalibration to fix a measurement error can raise 
fewer problems if substantive reasons can justify the move. As such, it is 
deemed to affect QCA especially in large-N (Maggetti & Levi-Faur 2013), or 
in «inductive» applications.  
Recalibration however can be misused if it treats as a measurement error 
what could instead be due to the bad determination of the truth table, or by a 
misspecified scope condition and other design problems. 
 
.2. Fooled by technicalities 
Another quite disputed point is how reliable the technicality is for 
induction, because of two main reasons: ambiguity, and limited diversity.  
a) Ambiguous sufficiency 
All the theoretically possible alternative configurations in the truth table 
are potential statements of sufficiency, which cases actualize and associate to 
an outcome. Especially in fsQCA, however, such statements do not come all 
with the same strength. The subset relationship of a configuration to any 
outcome may be far from perfect - indicating an ambiguous triggering 
capacity. Conclusion based on such evidence may therefore be flawed.  
The technique then addresses the problem by excluding such ambiguous 
configurations from the minimization to the outcome. A gauge of the strength 
of the relationship is provided by a special parameter of fit, the «consistency 
of sufficiency» («S-consistency» for short), ranging from 0 (total 
inconsistency, hence perfect subset relation to the complement of the 
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outcome) and 1 (total consistency, hence perfect subset relation to the 
outcome). Conventionally, ambiguity is deemed to affect those configurations 
with S-consistency below 0,75, but caution raises the threshold to at least 
0,80. Only configurations associated to the outcome with a stronger 
relationship than the threshold will be minimized for solution. In such way, 
the results will be free from false positives - although sometimes at the cost of 
generating «coverage outliers» (an unknown problem in csQCA).  
b) Limited diversity 
Indeed, non-contradictory truth tables and consistent minimizations are 
not enough to automatically secure valid results - mainly because of limited 
diversity. The problem goes beyond the too-many-variables-too-few-cases 
curse. No matter the number of cases, a truth table from actual data is hardly 
saturated, because some of the theoretically possible configurations simply 
prove empirically or (onto)logically impossible to happen in the population of 
interest. Nevertheless, the experimental rationale requires that all these 
counterfactuals are taken into account, for solutions to be valid. To those who 
take the rationale seriously, a simple minimization of the observed 
configurations alone, like in complex solution, does not seem enough to infer 
causal results - simply because the matching is fatally entrenched in records 
and «missingness» (Varsey 2014).  
The use of unobserved configurations - «logical remainders» - is therefore 
the unavoidable requisite of causal results. In QCA, this entails that 
unobserved configurations are given a value in the truth table, so that they 
can match observed configurations with same «truth» values. But where do 
these truth values can come from? 
A first possibility is: from the heuristics of parsimony. Unobserved 
configurations can simply be used under the assumption that they always 
contribute to the same outcome than observed configurations, if this gets to 
more general results. This, in the analysis of the positive outcome, would 
imply that the mechanism can trigger regardless of how conditions combine - 
except for the observed negatives, which would be anyway excluded from 
minimizations. The assumption then really challenges the hypothesis because 
it basically assumes its empirical irrelevance. This occurs by virtue of the 
special rationale of QCA minimization, especially the one embedded in the 
Quine–McCluskey algorithm. What the algorithm looks for in 
counterfactuals is not a reason to keep a condition from a theory, but a reason 
to drop it as irrelevant. The paradoxical result is that if all the «logical 
remainders» are true, then the starting theory is false. Vice-versa, if all the 
QCA, Applications and Challenges  
January 15-16, 2015 | Tilburg 






logical remainders are false, then they cannot be minimized with the observed 
configurations to the positive outcome and the starting theory is true - but 
then, all we can end with are our observed primitive configurations alone, 
that is, little more than tautological descriptions. And these actually are the 
rationales beneath the first two kinds of solutions displayed in Standard QCA 
- namely, the «complex» (all remainders false) and the «parsimonious» (all 
remainders true).  
The disturbing element of parsimonious heuristics is that the algorithm 
can make a contradictory use of unobserved configurations while getting to 
the solution. A same logical remainder can therefore enter negative and 
positive minimizations alike - i.e., it can be used as it was capable of 
generating a different outcome depending on its match. This is hard to accept 
if we maintain that the truth table shares with any other analytical causal 
space some key features, necessary to perform induction: hence, that it is a 
close, single, non-contradictory space (Bakhsar 1975, Lazarsfeld & Burton 
1956). So, especially when dealing with logical remainders, some criteria are 
required to avoid their contradictory use. Moreover, QCA is meant for 
delivering as realistic solutions as possible. Thus, we may want to sort 
untenable from plausible truth values of logical remainders, so that the latter 
alone enter minimizations. Criteria for guiding the researcher’s decisions on 
whether using or barring special remainders to an outcome are usually found 
in (1) theory, (2) ontology, and (3) empirics (Rihoux & Ragin 2009, 
Schneider & Wagemann 2012). 
Theory implies expectations that a special status of a condition, or a special 
conjunction of key conditions, leads to some outcome. Consequently, the 
logical remainders which display the condition or the conjunction may be 
given a positive value, consistently with expectations. As an alternative, in 
order to preserve these conjunctions from minimizations so that they will 
certainly appear in the solution, counterfactuals can be barred if, once used, 
they would make the key conjunction irrelevant. A more sophisticated view 
allows minimizations of observed configurations and «easy counterfactuals» 
alone: so, if evidence tells us that a configuration obtains in absence of 
condition C, and C is theoretically expected to contribute to the outcome, then 
the matching counterfactual in which C is present can be associated to the 
outcome, too. This rationale can be also extended to «uneasy counterfactuals» 
- i.e., logical remainders which violate the theoretical assumptions about the 
generative power of a condition - that so can also be barred. A possible 
critique to such theory-driven use of counterfactuals is that it imposes a 
confirmatory bias on results - the only added value lying in some detail, and 
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perhaps in some new path. The critique however applies to those 
manipulations alone aiming at the preservation of some pattern by shielding 
it from minimizations to irrelevance. In any other case, theoretical 
expectations will rather work against the preservation of the hypothesis as 
such. Indeed, easy counterfactuals are the conventional correction that the 
software applies to parsimonious minimizations in QCA Standard Analysis, 
resulting into the third kind of solution - the «intermediate» - which is 
usually presented as the refined QCA findings. Nevertheless, easy 
counterfactuals may not be enough to get solutions rid of the inconsistencies 
of simplifying assumptions. Further criteria may hence be required to 
adjudicate on the outcome of a contradictory logical remainder. 
Ontology. Another reason that can justify the direct assignment of truth 
values to logical remainders is the researcher’s consideration of the 
plausibility of the (onto)logical assumptions. Nonsensical configurations 
postulating impossible combinations of conditions can be considered false 
and barred - either from the minimizations to the outcome to which they do 
not make sense, or from minimizations tout court. This second choice however 
would constrain the possibility of reductions in the complementary analysis.  
Evidence. Intervention on logical remainders may also be justified if 
previous evidence indicates that a condition has an empirical explanatory 
power such that it should appear in solutions, but the parsimonious 
minimizations make it disappear. This is especially the case of necessary 
conditions, detected at the beginning of the analysis when the parameters of 
fit are calculated for all the explanatory conditions. These parameters reveal 
whether each condition is individually necessary (i.e. a superset) to the 
occurrence of the positive or the negative outcome; how perfectly 
(consistency); and with which empirical relevance (coverage). Convention 
has it that a condition is necessary to the outcome if its «consistency of 
necessity» value (or «N-consistency») is higher than 0,95. In such case, the 
condition will appear in almost all the paths of the solution to that outcome - 
so that it can be factorized. From its set-theoretical definition, we also know 
that when a condition is necessary, there cannot be cases carrying the 
outcome which do not display it. Therefore, to preserve a necessary condition 
into solutions, we can bar from minimizations all those contradictory logical 
remainders which would violate this rule - and use them for the minimization 
of the complement. On a similar vein, a further strategy to deal with 
contradictory minimizations can be deduced from empirical sufficiency. The 
analysis of necessity also calculates the value of the «consistency of 
sufficiency» («S-consistency») when it provides the empirical relevance of 
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necessity relationships. Again, the threshold for a non-ambiguous sufficiency 
is usually set between 0,80-0,85; the higher the value, the more perfect the 
subset relationship of the condition to the outcome. From the definition, we 
know that a sufficient condition is such that all the cases which display it 
also display the outcome, so that no case with the condition can be expected 
to lead to the complement. High values of S-consistency can thus provide a 
guideline for decisions about contradictory simplifying assumptions in the 
complement.  
Empirical adjudication on contradictory simplifying assumptions may be 
preferred to theoretical preserving ones as it avoids confirmation biases and 
keeps minimizations consistent to clear distributional evidence. Whatever 
the strategy, however, the methodological literature suggests a further 
standard that results should meet to prove the inference valid: complex, 
intermediate, and parsimonious solutions should prove perfect nested 
supersets of increasing generality (Schneider & Wagemann 2012). 
Yet, a good inference cannot certify validity if it does not apply to a sound 
design. 
 
.3. Fooled by design 
In a sense, QCA techniques assume sufficient causality, and so specific 
that its occurrence cannot be a simple random effect. Were it random, the N- 
and S-consistency parameters of the conditions in the hypothesis would be 
low to the point of leading to solutions not consistent enough for 
minimization. Also, Quine-McCluskey’s minimizations do challenge the 
validity of the starting statement of sufficiency extensively: «The method of 
elimination is superior to both Mill’s method of agreement and his indirect 
method of difference because the focus is on eliminating causal conditions, 
not confirming them» (Ragin 1987). To many, however, this does not mean 
that what is left is causal - and reasonably so. In a nutshell, if correlation is 
not causation, neither is configuration (Pawson 2008, Schneider & Rohlfing 
2013, Schneider & Wagemann 2010).  
The correspondence of results to some ontological connection can be 
quite shaky when QCA is used inductively, for discovering a theory from 
somehow related conditions. Indeed, there is no technique which can secure 
causality unless it treats factors or properties which are deemed causal for 
reasons external to the technique itself - namely, theoretical. Possible new 
causal relations may rather be suggested when a theoretical hypothesis 
proves logically true yet unable to account for all the cases - which indicates 
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that the starting hypothesis is under-specified. Coverage outliers thus 
provide a puzzle that may lead to refined or enlarged hypotheses, 
operationalization, and testing. The underlying requisite however remains 
that the starting hypothesis relates to the triggering and defusing of some 
mechanism of interest - which provides the proper rationale for making sense 
of configurational solutions, and of their limits. Only so, coherence can be of 
the whole analytical process - not only of the technical part of induction.  
The selection of theoretically consistent conditions cannot be enough to 
minimize the risk that, despite the technical machinery above, results are still 
flawed. A further unaddressed problem lies in the over-specification of the 
starting hypothesis. The problem is somehow neglected by standard QCA, 
which assumes that minimizations will tackle it properly. However, this may 
not be true. Once a condition is considered as constitutive of the first 
statement of sufficiency, all the analysis will treat it as it were causal - 
dropping it only if logical remainders can prove its irrelevance. Yet, its 
presence can still inflate solutions and contribute to exacerbate problems of 
measurement, contradictions, ambiguity, and limited diversity (Marx 2006).  
Consolidated solutions to over-determination rest on the aggregation of 
conditions in the starting hypothesis into higher-order constructs (Schneider 
& Wagemann 2010, Elman 2005), which however may still not be enough. A 
different approach suggests that a two-step QCA can be applied (Schneider 
& Wagemann 2006): yet, this can be only appropriate when the starting 
hypothesis is really made of explanatory factors belonging to two separate 
ontological levels - that of remote catalysts, and of proximate reactants.  
A different rationale considers the opportunity of dropping conditions on 
the basis of their explanatory power. Especially necessary conditions can 
prove trivial: because of a N-consistency so high - a distribution so close to a 
constant - to appear almost tautological to the outcome; or because of a N-
coverage so low to look like an idiosyncratic explanation (Braumoeller & 
Goertz 2000, Schneider & Wagemann 2012). Yet, dropping a condition on 
the basis of its distribution may prove unwise: once in solutions, necessary 
conditions usually improve the fitting of the model; moreover, the absence of 
an almost-constant condition may be the only difference in the configuration 
of a case otherwise contradictory.  
On a similar vein, it has been suggested that the streamlining of the 
starting hypothesis can result from the automatic identification of «small 
causal chains» among the conditions in the hypothesis (Baumgartner 2013). 
The rationale here again borrows concerns from the nomothetic camp and 
implicitly equates QCA chemical configurations to linear billiard-balls causal 
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structures. This can of course make sense only if the original hypothesis is 
formulated in time-QCA terms, and the order of reactants deemed causal. 
Otherwise, the concern may lead to an unreasonably underdetermined 
explanatory hypothesis. Actually, that conditions are not totally 
«independent» makes almost no problem in QCA. Rather, conditions are 
required to prove a theoretical capacity of activating a mechanism, hence 
generating the outcome. As such, it is true enough that better explanatory 
hypotheses focus on the triggering, hindering and enabling conditions that 
are proximate to the outcome- there where causality unfolds. Yet, as much as 
these conditions are not totally overlapping - i.e., do not cover exactly the 
same cases, thus suggesting that they operationalize almost the same 
property - no actual suspect of mutual dependency can justify the exclusion 
of one of them. Neither can they be substituted by some alleged «common 
underlying factor» of which they may be «effecting mediators» - unless, once 
again, poor fit and QCA outliers would indicate that the model is 
underdetermined instead, so that the common factor would play as a 
necessary condition for the generative capacity of the two effectors1. In a 
nutshell, the identification of a properly determined starting hypothesis from 
an array of theoretical generative candidates cannot follow distributional or 
linear criteria. Rather, selection criteria should be identified that are 
consistent with the rationale of the method - which require some Boolean 
proof of the difference-making capacity of the explanatory candidates. 
A more consistent solution can hence consist in the step-wise 
determination of the explanatory model from a purposefully wide array of 
theoretically generative candidate conditions. The construction can rely on 
the information about the N- and S-consistency values provided by the 
analysis of necessity in the early steps of the research protocol. The starting 
point for its construction would hence be constituted by the two conditions 
with higher consistency values of necessity and sufficiency. These first two of 
course generate contradictions in the population - which should be addressed 
by looking for the further condition capable of unraveling the highest number 
                                                        
1 However improper, the concern highlights a feature of QCA of which researchers should be aware: a 
certain degree of under-determinacy should be considered endemic to QCA solutions. At best, QCA usually 
finds sufficient, and seldom necessary and sufficient, explanations to the outcome at the case level (although 
N- and S-consistency exactly account for the distance of a case from the line of necessity-and-sufficiency, 
which is therefore embedded as benchmark of causality). The reason for «sufficient only solutions» is quite 
commonsense: the statement of sufficiency unfolds and is tested within a special necessary condition - 
namely, the scope condition - which cannot be operationalized, as it would really be a useless constant, 
hence with which the starting hypothesis does not interact. The basic assumption about the scope 
conditions rather is that it implies many other models, and causes, which in the studies are nevertheless 
deemed irrelevant for the conditions in the hypothesis to obtain - unless some widening of the analytic 
scope creates new contradictions which may require the operationalization of some property of the old 
scope conditions. Therefore the relevance of a clear and reasoned scope condition for case selection. 
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of contradictions, and by adding it to the explanatory model, recursively 
unless the resulting truth-table is totally consistent. Such protocol will thus 
result in a properly determined starting hypothesis - and hopefully reduce its 
complexity to a conjunction with the minimal number of conditions required 
to account for the outcome properly. Positive effects will also reverberate on 
limited diversity. Also, the strategy promises to allow the analysis of causality 
in designs with higher or lower numbers of cases - provided that they can be 
thought as proper sub- and super-populations with respect of the model: 
wider scope with too many cases missing may make any evaluation 
unreliable, as little but theoretical expectations can drive the decision about 
contradictory simplifying assumptions. Nevertheless, the stepwise protocol 
comes at some cost. While it may not hinder the capacity of detecting 
measurement errors in threshold settings from the interplay of conditions and 
outcome, it nevertheless assumes symmetry in conditions, and may work 
properly with standard fsQCA alone. Under other kinds of calibrations - 
especially if the complement is left open and unexplored (Thiem 2014) - the 
procedure may develop on a less clear empirical ground. 
 
4. Some final considerations 
By itself, all that QCA can answer is the twofold question alone of «why 
did it fail here, but not there?». However limited these questions may seem, it 
is worth noting that no previous method has been able to answer 
satisfactorily before - nomothetic strategies, for their inner limitation to 
average considerations; idiographic methods, for their mainly conceptual 
ambitions and little systematic proofs.  
The usefulness of QCA knowledge is therefore hard to deny: it provides an 
interesting operationalization to conditional causation; it can address issues 
about fairly stable variables; it explains the past of single cases as types. Its 
strategy greatly improves cross-case comparisons as it is not simply based on 
the more-or-less justified selection of few cases dissimilar in all but the 
outcome to look for commonalities, or similar in all but the outcome to look 
for differences: rather, it builds a structure of systematic counterfactual 
arguments for which some properly selected population of cases provide 
evidence, and solutions depend on the identification of irrelevant conditions 
by the Boolean treatment of pairwise matches.  
If the starting hypothesis operationalizes a mechanism, is non-
contradictory and properly determined, and if the counterfactuals are treated 
properly, then the method can lead to valid conclusions - about which 
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configuration explained the outcome in one or more cases. The lessons for the 
cases in negative configurations to be learned may be that, be they willing to 
improve their outcome, they should shift in one of the nearest positive 
configurations at their choice. In so doing, it of course makes assumptions - 
which however are explicit and open to scrutiny.  
QCA thus comes with assumptions, and shares many concerns with twin 
analyses in the two other camps. Despite they can offer interesting 
suggestions, improvement can only be developed within the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of the method. 
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